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ARTICLES
"A Republic . .. If You Can Keep It."
by HANS A. LINDE*
For the 200th birthday of the Constitution, a generous government
provided more than cakes, candles, and overtime work for the academic
Constitution industry. Beyond all the historical pageantry, the three
branches thoughtfully joined to stage two entirely realistic and serious
contemporary dramas.
First, the executive branch, impersonated by two directors and one
assistant of the National Security Council, secretly sold arms to the gov-
ernment of Iran, an action that no participant could have believed to
have the approval of the Congress or the public, and then diverted funds
from the sale to give weapons to insurgents seeking to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua. Congress had refused the President's request
for such funds, and the scheme was designed to circumvent congressional
opposition.
Second, Justice Lewis Powell retired, giving the President the op-
portunity to nominate Judge Robert Bork, and setting the stage for an-
other show focused on his constitutional views and on the Senate's role in
confirming judges. The Bork show, like much of the Bicentennial, fea-
tured individual rights prematurely, because in 1787 it was the state con-
stitutions that placed declarations of rights ahead of the structures of
government, as they still do today, while Congress did not submit a na-
tional Bill of Rights until 1789. Between the two years lay the fight for
ratification. So it seems timely, in a Biddle lecture for 1988, to talk about
the institutions whose basic form was accepted 200 years ago, and what,
in the light of recent experience, we might ask of them if we were to
ratify them now for another century.
* Justice, Supreme Court of Oregon. This Commentary was delivered at Harvard Law
School on October 17, 1988, as the Seventh Biennial Francis Biddle Lecture. The text has not
been expanded or changed to include events after that date.
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I.
I take my title from Benjamin Franklin's answer to a lady who
asked him whether the Convention had produced a republic or a monar-
chy: "A Republic... if you can keep it."1 Republican institutions were
designed to preserve liberty, not only for the nation but in each state.2
As a judge, I shall have something to say about the judicial role in that
task. But we shall not lose sight of three elementary points. First, the
Constitution is a system of politics, not only of law. Changes such as the
displacement of party organizations by television campaigns alter the
political constitution without any change in the law.
Second, some ordinary legislation changes the political constitution
more than some constitutional amendments do. Examples are congres-
sional reorganization and budgeting laws, the so-called legislative veto,
the spread of primary elections, and the public financing of presidential
campaigns.
Third, public officials are bound to abide by the laws and the consti-
tution, as they swear to do, whether or not a court tells them so. Courts,
however, are routinely called upon to tell officials what they may or may
not do, normally without protest by the officials.
The political constitution invites constantly shifting anxieties.
Woodrow Wilson saw a dominance of congressional government. Ar-
thur Schlesinger, Jr., decried an imperial presidency. Robert Jackson
during the New Deal and conservatives during the 1960s struggled with
judicial supremacy. Common Cause sees us governed by political action
committees. A Committee on the Constitutional System headed by
Lloyd Cutler, C. Douglas Dillon, and Senator Nancy Kassebaum in 1987
deplored the lost capacity of political parties to combine an administra-
tion with a majority in the Congress.3 "Federalism is routinely pro-
nounced dead and then resuscitated. A few of these anxieties for the
republic actually involve constitutional law.
The issues of Biddle's time, 50 years ago, were structural issues of
1. Papers of Dr. Jaiies McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, reprinted in
UNITED STATES GOVhRNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 952 (1927). As so reprinted, Mc-
Henry's notes read as follows (with punctuation as in the original):
"A lady asked Dr. Franklin Well Doctor whai have we got a republic or a monarchy. A
republic replied the Doctor if you can keep it."
2. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4.
3. Cutler, To Form a Government, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (D.
Robinson ed. 1985). See also Acayo, Is it Broke? Should We Fix It?, TIME, July 6, 1987, at 54.
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government, as they had been since Marbury, Gibbons, and McCulloch.'
Supreme Court doctrines of interstate commerce and taxation that hob-
bled both state and federal powers drove Roosevelt in 1937 to push the
unsuccessful Court-packing plan. Without being packed, the Court rap-
idly broadened congressional power over commerce, sustained use of the
taxing power to provide social security and to induce state unemploy-
ment programs, and began to dismantle tax immunities and to enhance
the states' regulatory and common law powers. Senator Hugo Black
was appointed to the court in 1937, followed in short order by the ap-
pointments of Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, Frank Murphy, William
0. Douglas, and Robert H. Jackson, all executive branch men, none pre-
viously a judge. They were chosen for their views on the government's
agenda, not on individual rights. Civil liberties decisions flourished as a
side effect.'
The Court's social reforms in the name of equality, fair procedure,
religious diversity, and personal "privacy" lay far over the horizon.
They were not the central agenda of the Roosevelt judges or of the presi-
dent who appointed them. State and federal powers posed the issues
about which Frankfurter, in his first year on the Court, wrote that "the
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it[,]" 7 and about which then Solicitor General
Jackson said in 1939: "We are really back to the Constitution."8 But
state and federal powers were not the only structural issues. In 1935, the
Court had told Roosevelt that he could not replace a Federal Trade
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1,6 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Wagner Act);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 .U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding unemployment benefits);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding old-age benefits); Helvering v. Gerhardt,
304 U.S. 405 (1938) (allowing IRS taxation of income of N.Y. Port Authority employees);
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (uphold-
ing state power to regulate size of trucks); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (ruling
that common law is state, not federal, law).
6. DeJonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (First Amendment restrains state
pursuit of radicals); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (state which pro-
vides in-state legal education for whites must do same for blacks); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (First Amendment protects speakers at labor rallies); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (state cannot restrict door-to-door canvassing where government purpose can be
achieved through less restrictive means); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (First
Amendment protects Jehovah's Witness whose message, while angering some, posed no "clear
and present danger").
7. Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring),
8. Jackson, Back to the Constitution, 25 A.B.A.J. 745 (1939).
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Commissioner at will;9 in 1938 the President swallowed his constitu-
tional objections and let Congress subject his authority over executive
reorganization to disapproval by a majority vote in both houses-a legis-
lative veto.' °
These were domestic issues. But also, in 1937 and 1938, Japan in-
vaded China, Mussolini and Hitler helped install Franco in Spain, and
Hitler took over Austria and dismantled Czechoslovakia. One opinion
by Justice Sutherland, once a member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, had sustained Roosevelt's prohibition of arms sales to Bo-
livia and Paraguay under the Neutrality Act of 1934 with elaborate dicta
about a "delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President" in inter-
national relations." Another Sutherland opinion affirmed the Presi-
dent's power by an executive agreement to take over private assets in a
New York bank that had been confiscated from its owners by the Soviet
government.' 2 The beginning of World War II in 1939 ended 20 years of
isolationism and altered the constitutional landscape for two generations.
The war brought issues of presidential power, such as the sale of
destroyers to Great Britain, a dozen seizures of private facilities, and the
forced relocation or detention of civilians solely because of their Japanese
descent, which faced first Jackson and then Biddle as Attorney General.
The war was declared by Congress, but it did not end with a return to
peace-time "normalcy," as Harding had proclaimed in 1921. Instead it
left the nation with large military forces stationed in conquered and di-
vided countries, new alliances and international organizations, the facts
and the fears of Soviet expansion and Maoist revolution, a radically new
atomic weapon and an obsession with its secrecy, and a large catalogue of
emergency legislation, and with an executive establishment to match, in-
cluding a new Central Intelligence Agency that soon went beyond col-
lebting and analyzing intelligence. It also left us with a vague but
ominous concept called national security. 1,
But the landscape of 1938 also included the indelible images of total-
itarianism. Justice Jackson invoked these images explicitly when, in the
middle of war, the Supreme Court held that public schools could not
impose patriotism by a compulsory flag salute.' 3 The Court would not
again be insensitive to religious diversity. Judges who had livedthrough
9. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
10. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENT 164-166 (1985).
11. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
12. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
13. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943),
referring to the compelled unanimity sought by "our present totalitarian enemies," Jackson
the decade of the Gestapo, the burning of "degenerate" books, and the
Nuremberg racial laws could not remain indifferent to police abuses, cen-
sorship, or legal racism in the United States. The Court faltered in the
intersection between political radicalism and national security. But even
here, the court at least sought for safeguards of legal authorization and
procedure. 14
This briefly summarizes the constitutional lawyer's world of Bid-
dle's era, the era of redefining constitutional power. It ended 15 years
after it began, with the "Steel Seizure" case in 1952.15 Its end coincided
with the election of General Eisenhower, halting McCarthyism when it
had outlived its political usefulness to his party, along with Senator John
Bricker's proposed amendment to limit the force of international agree-
ments,16 and with the appointment of a new Chief Justice, Earl Warren.
So much for ancient history.
We can now fast-forward the tape twenty-five years. A more recent
generation has not thought of power as the heart of constitutional law.
For a quarter century, the Court's attention turned to the protection of
individual rights, particularly against the power of the state and local
governments that regulate most aspects of daily life. The Court disman-
tled racial segregation.' 7 It elaborated the Bill of Rights and due process
by reforming state criminal procedures,"8 restricting defamation and ob-
scenity laws,19 opening the streets to public controversies, 2° and adding a
new substantive right of "privacy."'" It extended equality to categories
beyond race and to structural reform of legislative districts2 2 and access
to the ballot.23
wrote: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unity of the graveyard."
14. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (passport may not be denied for refusal to
submit affidavit concerning membership in Communist Party); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959) (Dept. of Defense not authorized to revoke security clearance without due process);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (House of Representatives Committee on Un-
American Activities not authorized to investigate private activity for sole purpose of exposing
that activity, but only for a legislative purpose).
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
16. S.J. REs. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 6777-78 (1953).
17. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Thus, a generation learned to identify constitutional law with the
judicial protection of individual rights. A hornbook published, with
spectacularly bad timing, in 1939, devoted four pages each to equal pro-
tection and to freedom of speech and press.24 One scholar recently ob-
served that three-quarters of the material in his 1100-page casebook deals
with civil rights and civil liberties cases, after removing the crucial guar-
antees of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments to a separate
course in criminal procedure.25
The Court's doctrines met academic criticism as well as political
opposition. They spawned a deluge of theories of interpretation, or
noninterpretation, theories of language and original intent and moral
philosophy, none of which we shall pursue here. But the Senate's defeat
of Judge Bork's nomination, the second of our two Bicentennial dramas,
accurately recorded even stronger opposition to undoing the Warren
Court's accomplishments for liberty and equality.
II.
Meanwhile, however, events outside the courthouse reminded us
that the Bill of Rights was not the first or the only guarantee of liberty.
The republic was meant to guarantee it. And the republic was in serious
trouble.
Fearing Soviet subversion abroad, presidents used the CIA to emu-
late it, secretly conspiring (to quote what the Smith Act 26 forbids domes-
tically) to overthrow by force and violence governments in Iran,
Guatemala, and elsewhere.27 To prevent unification of Vietnam under
Communist rule, presidents escalated that effort into a long and bloody
military campaign without asking the American people to go to war.
Congress could evade explicit responsibility, and the Supreme Court, by
denying certiorari, told lower courts not to get involved.28 President
Nixon secretly extended the non-war to Cambodia. After his 1972 re-
election campaign, hubris in the White House turned to paranoia and led
to the constitutional crisis we call Watergate.
Few constitutional conflicts are crises, and a crisis need not involve
any real dispute about constitutional law. Watergate was a genuine cri-
24. H. ROTTSCHAEFER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 551-555, 756-760 (1939).
25. Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 17, 30
(1988).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385 (1982).
27. A Secret Arms Network's Ever Expanding Cast, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 16,
1987, at 30.
28. Mora v. McNamara, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
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sis, as the Iran-Contra affair was not, because Watergate posed a threat
to the nation's governing institutions that was not resolved by normal
political or judicial means. It was resolved only by Nixon's imminent
impeachment, followed by the first resignation of a president from office.
But the crisis was not merely personal. Professor Philip Kurland wrote
about Watergate and the Constitution: "The primary evil revealed by the
events of Watergate was the presidency: not the man, but the office. It
was and is bloated with unrestrained power, available for use for good or
evil, with little or no accountability for the use to which it is put."'29 The
cause, he wrote, was the failure to limit authority, "the result of a long
denial of institutional values in favor of temporary political expedi-
ency. . .[,]" the failure of the Congress and of the Supreme Court to
restrain delegated power and its concentration in the Executive Office of
the President.30 Department heads might act with simple venality, as in
the days of Teapot Dome; the corruption of power must, and did, lie
closer to the center.
Nixon did not appreciate the republic, yet the republic owes him
some debts. By resigning, he broke the spell of an elective four-year
kingship terminable only by death. It became unsurprising for President
Reagan to promise to quit if his health were impaired, as Woodrow Wil-
son had not done. Nixon's resignation (following that of his Vice Presi-
dent, Spiro Agnew) rid the political constitution of the dangerous
anachronism of actually trying an impeached President before the Sen-
ate. Nixon's excesses aroused Congress to repeal the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution3" and to pass a War Powers Resolution over his veto,32 to impose
new controls on impoundment of appropriated funds and on emergency
powers. 33 The Supreme Court rebuffed Nixon's attempt to enjoin the
New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon
Papers.34
29. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 153 (1978).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Act of Jan. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(84 Stat.) 2053 repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1973, P.L. 93-189, § 26(4), 87 Stat. 731.
32. Act of Nov. 3, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(87 Stat.) 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
33. Act of Sept. 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(90 Stat.) 1255 (modifying emergency powers), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621, 1622,
1631, 1641, 1651; Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (88 Stat.) 332 (1974) (controlling impoundment of appropriated funds), originally codi-
fied at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407, now codified at U.S.C. §§ 681-688. See also Franck, After the
Fall: The New Procedural Framework for Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 605 (1977).
34. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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Nixon dramatized the Senate's investigatory power, embodied by
Senator Sam Ervin. By overblown claims of executive privilege, Nixon
discredited this doctrine to the point that President Reagan did not press
it in the Iran-Contra hearings. Finally, by forcing the discharge of the
Justice Department's own special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, over the
resignation of its two top officials, Nixon brought on the passage of the
Independent Counsel Law.35
Did last year's Iran-Contra show prove that our republican institu-
tions triumphed at Watergate? Not quite. First, the Watergate crisis
lasted too long, a year and a half, during which White House attention
was distracted from the effects of the 1973 Middle East war, inflationary
oil prices, SALT negotiations, and the Cyprus conflict between two
NATO allies.
Second, Watergate misdirected the pursuit of accountability into the
images of criminal law. It featured the search for the "smoking gun." It
ended with White House officials going to prison and the President re-
ceiving a pardon from his successor. Congress made prosecution of
crimes the centerpiece of the Independent Counsel's task. Thus, Presi-
dent Reagan could claim that no laws were broken in the Iran-Contra
affair, and his attorney general could claim to be vindicated because he
was not indicted.
Third, it was not Congress as an abstraction that asserted its prerog-
atives and insisted on holding the White House accountable. It was a
Congress of political beings in which both houses contained a majority
opposed to the President's party. We do not know what a Congress
under Republican control would have done with the same allegations of
wrongdoing by Nixon's or Reagan's men. I do not speak of individual
members but of the political institution. We do know that such defense
as there was came from the Presidents' partisans. If partisanship did not
drive Congress to act, at least partisanship did not inhibit it. But if ac-
countability depends on adversary leadership of the two branches, is
political stalemate too high a price to pay?
Some experienced people think so. In the 50 years since 1938, the
House of Representatives has been under Democratic leadership for
forty-six years, and the Senate for forty,36 while Republicans have occu-
pied the White House sixteen of the last twenty years. Political scientists
routinely mourn the demise of party government and propose ways to
revive it. James Sundquist observes that divided leadership prevented
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988).
36. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1988 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 242 (Table No. 404).
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any effective domestic initiatives under Eisenhower or Nixon, or under
Reagan after his first two years.37 It led to sixty-three vetoes in Ford's
twenty-nine month presidency and thwarted his foreign policy, and it let
Reagan blame the Congress for unprecedented deficits.38 James Reston
writes that until we elect presidents and congressional majorities of the
same party, we cannot have an effective foreign policy.
3 9
Lloyd Cutler, while President Carter's White House Counsel and
later, called for new ways to form a government, in the European sense,
that could at least enact a budget and follow through on its international
agreements. 40 But even changes that Congress could make without con-
stitutional amendment are unlikely to be made.41 Instead, after each fail-
ure, we continue to look to the next election rather than to institutional
change to resolve the conflict. We shall continue to face the dilemma of
whether we need a majority in Congress of the President's party to get
effective government or a majority of the opposing party to keep the ad-
ministration honest-a dilemma, that is, unless other institutions can
safeguard the republic.
III.
The first line of defense is the government's own lawyers. Legal
counsel occupy high positions in all executive departments, including
37. J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 76-78
(1986).
38. Id.
39. The Oregonian, Sept. 14, 1988, at C8, col. 3.
40. Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 25,
32-35 (1985); Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126 (1980).
41. The Committee on the Constitutional System that Cutler co-chaired with Douglas
Dillon and Sen. Nancy Kassebaum published a number of proposals, such as changing election
dates and allowing members of Congress to serve in the Cabinet. Cutler, To Form A Govern-
ment, in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 11-13 (D. Robinson ed. 1985). Of those that
would require a constitutional amendment, a longer term for Representatives may be worth
the effort, Cabinet service by members of Congress is not. A member of Congress who be-
comes Secretary of the Treasury, like Kentucky's Fred Vinson (appointed by Truman), or
Secretary of Defense, like Wisconsin's Melvin Laird (appointed by Nixon), still would have to
deal with respective congressional committees as the President's agent, not as a member of
Congress, and his duty to attend to national priorities over those of his constituents might well
cost him re-election at home.
If Congress were determined to change its institutional relations with the executive, stat-
utes and political custom would suffice to centralize domestic policy, including the all-impor-
tant tax and budgetary functions, under a Super Secretary who, by custom, must have served
with distinction in the Congress and would resign if repudiated by both Houses on the budget
or another major issue.
But no such move toward the French form of bohabitation between a President and a
legislative majority is likely. It might fit Reagan's presidential style, or Eisenhower's. It would
be inconceivable for Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon.
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those concerned with national security. An early response to the Iran-
Contra episode was to upgrade the position of the legal adviser to the
National Security Council.42 Lawyers and judges have headed the State
Department, the FBI and the CIA. The Justice Department has the im-
portant Office of Legal Counsel, a position once held by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia. The American government is not
noted for a shortage of lawyers. But whatever advice these lawyers give
within government, they cannot veto nor do they publicly contradict
political decisions.
Government lawyers drafted Truman's order seizing the steel mills
and Nixon's lawsuits to censor the New York Times and the Washington
Post. This year, we witnessed a spirited debate between Judge Abraham
Sofaer, the State Department's highly qualified Legal Adviser, and Sena-
tor Sam Nunn over a question of constitutional importance: whether
undisclosed negotiating records or official statements to the Senate
should govern the interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.43
Judge Sofaer may have been correct in arguing that the answer depends
on whether one speaks of the treaty's international or its domestic effect,
but the State Department's position was dictated by the President's de-
termination to proceed with the Star Wars program. Earlier State De-
partment Legal Advisers have found self-defense in every use of force.
Professor Chayes, Legal Adviser during the Kennedy Administration,
would not today make the argument for the General Assembly's power
to impose peacekeeping expenses on members of the United Nations that
he made when the United States did not expect to find itself in the minor-
ity position once held by the Soviet bloc. In fact, Ambassador (and for-
mer Justice) Arthur Goldberg backed away from the American position
soon after the International Court of Justice accepted it.'
After the Iran-Contra affair, as after Watergate, some looked to the
Attorney General as a potential guardian. During the Iran-Contra hear-
ings, Senator William Cohen deplored that recent Attorneys General
42. National Security Decision Directive 266 (Mar. 31, 1987), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No.
58, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987). See Fisher, How to Avoid Iran-Contras (Review Essay),-76
CALIF. L. REV. 939, 953 (1988).
43. Compare Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Intiative, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1972 (1986), and Sofaer, A Treaty Interpretation and the Separation of Powers (Re-
marks to the American Law Institute on May 19, 1988) (available in Hastings Law Library)
with Nunn, Arms Control in the Last Year of the Reagan Administration, reprinted in 134
CONG. REC. S2567-70 (daily ed. March 18, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Nunn on INF Treaty). See
also BUNN & PANOFSKY, ARMS CONTROL, COMPLIANCE, AND THE LAW, (Working Paper of
the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, May 1988).
44. See Linde, Book Review, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1382, 1391-92 (1967) (reviewing THE
STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER (R. Falk and S. Mendlovitz, eds. 1966)).
have appeared in the roles of chief law enforcement officer, member of
the National Security Council, and adviser to the President and often his
close personal or political associate, rather than as the "institutional pro-
tector of justice in America."45 The President of the American Bar As-
sociation asked last year's presidential candidates to commit themselves
to a nonpolitical Attorney General.46 But as Justice Jackson observed in
his "Steel Seizure" concurrence, the Attorney General is expected to de-
fend the views of the administration as long as he remains in it, even
though he might reject those views as a judge.47 President Nixon's for-
mer Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, maintains that unless the
office is radically changed, a president is entitled to an Attorney General
who carries out his policies in the Department of Justice. "Otherwise,
political elections would mean nothing."48
Justice Scalia, dissenting from the decision to uphold the Independ-
ent Counsel law, seems to argue that the Constitution compels Klein-
dienst's view because the President must "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."49 A look at the state constitutions shows otherwise.
In all but three, governors are told to take care that laws are faithfully
executed, yet forty-two states elect their attorneys general, 50 and com-
monly prosecutors, too, are independently elected.5 The task of prose-
cution is easily separated from that of giving official legal advice. A
president, like a governor, might displace a prosecutor who is not enforc-
ing the law; the problem, rather, arises when the President does not want
a prosecution to go forward. For the first thirty years, Congress thought
of the Attorney General as its lawyer as well as the President's, and ob-
45. MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour: Iran-Contra Hearings-Meese: Too Close to Coun-
sel/Hitting the Ceiling (PBS television broadcast July 29, 1985). Transcript # 3088, at 10-I1
[hereinafter MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour].
46. Hengstler, MacCrate: End Cronyism, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 1443. The Solicitor
General, within limits, can play an independent, nonpolitical role at least in constitutional
litigation. See L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1987). The potential role of an independent
attorney general and its limits were illustrated in Israel in 1986, when the attorney general
ordered an investigation into the killing of captured Palestinians by security agents. The Is-
raeli government promptly replaced the attorney general, and the replacement quickly
pardoned the agents. See Friedman, Israel's Leadership Problem, N. Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986,
at 22, col. 1.
On the role of department lawyers in the relocation of Japanese-Americans, see Wechsler,
Some Issues for the Lawyer, in INTEGRITY AND COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CONSCIENCE, 117 (R.M. MacIver ed. 1957).
47. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
48. MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour, supra n. 45, at 26.
49. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2637 (1988).
50. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL 63 (Table 1.41) (1971).
51. Id. at 106-07 (Table 2.13).
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tained his opinion on the drafting and constitutionality of bills.12 But
recently, the Attorney General has declined to apply acts of Congress
that the administration considers unconstitutional, leaving it to special
counsel to defend Congress's actions. 3
Independent election gives a state's attorney general the public stat-
ure to give formal opinions to the legislature and local governments and
to be a plausible watchdog of constitutional government, or it might if
the office were nonpartisan and precluded a subsequent candidacy for
governor. But even an elected attorney general's legal views are fallible,
or at least not final when tested in court. And of course we are not going
to have popular election of an Attorney General of the United States, as
one Senator proposed after Watergate. In short, even the executive's
ablest and most honorable lawyer cannot be the final judge of the execu-
tive's acts.
Congress as a whole is in a much stronger position. It can amend
the laws, abolish offices that it deems to be misused, and in theory use the
ultimate power of impeachment. Congress, too, has lawyers as able and
as devoted to the republic as any in the executive branch. Congress can
delegate to its committees the important power to investigate, to report,
and to recommend 4.5  But it cannot delegate to a committee authoritative
judgment of the executive's acts, nor is Congress the final judge of its
own acts, even in its internal decisions.5 1 In Congress, as in the execu-
tive, constitutional claims are arguments for or against the policy of the
moment. 6
There have been many suggestions for councils and committees
52. L. HUSTON, A.S. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R.G. DIXON, JR., ROLES OF THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (1968).
53. Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C.L. REV.
901, 902 (1987).
54. Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 102 (1986). Dean Brest writes that one can imagine special
committees charged with reporting on constitutional issues after hearing arguments, but he
cautions that committees could not replicate or replace the courts.
55. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (congressional denial of seat to elected
representative is justiciable controversy).
56. Judge Abner Mikva, who as an Illinois representative was untypically aware of con-
gressional responsibility for constitutional judgments, was amused when he was asked to re-
cuse himself in the Independent Counsel case on grounds that he must have concluded that the
law was constitutional when he voted for it: "Members of Congress believe that's what courts
are for." Greenhouse, What's a Lawmaker to Do About the Constitution?, N. Y. Times, June 3,
1988, at B6, col 3. The same article quoted Rep. William Dannemeyer: "[I]f we happen to be
opposed to something, we'll look for respectable reasons to oppose it. The Constitution is a
reason. That's politics." Id. But cf. Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Con-
gress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707, 728 (1985) (arguing that Congress has the duty and ample re-
sources to perform its own effective consitutional analysis).
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within the White House, the Congress, or both,5 7 with or without powers
to decide as well as to review and to report, echoes of councils that ex-
isted in some of the original state constitutions and were proposed by
Madison and Hamilton but rejected at the Convention.58 None of these
watchdogs is quite the right breed. The best council of legal experts
would be neither infallible nor final, in Justice Jackson's phrase, and it
would likely find itself picking and choosing among generalities in
Supreme Court opinions that would not constrain the Court itself. A
body whose assignment is to guard the Constitution would pontificate
about the Constitution even when on ordinary law would suffice, as it
usually does. Legal experts alone could not guard the Constitution if the
question is compliance in fact rather than doubt about the law. That
would require that the body have subpoena power and authority to pro-
ceed on its own initiative-a stronger version of the Civil Rights Com-
mission, reaching issues beyond that commission's agenda and
constituency.59 Ad hoc bodies like the Tower Commission and the spe-
cial Iran-Contra and Watergate committees offer prestige and visibility
but sacrifice continuity. A permanent watchdog, on the other hand,
needs something to do and is likely to chase mice when no bigger game is
at hand.
We are looking, then, for something with these characteristics: (1)
It must be a permanent institution, with authority beyond that of its
changing members; (2) it must be nonpartisan and independent of Con-
gress and the President, and seen to be so; (3) it must explain its conclu-
sions publicly, not advise in secret; (4) it must have some fact-finding
procedures if facts are decisive; (5) it must maintain a long view, beyond
the exigencies of the immediate case; and (6) it must have enough other
work so that a constitutional case is the exception rather than its raison
d'Stre.
57. Professor Arthur S. Miller, for example, proposed a "council of state" within the
President's office, to be overseen by a special joint committee of Congress. A. Miller, A Propo-
salfor a Council of State in the Office of the Presidency: Exegesis on Wormuth and Firmage's
To Chain the Dog of War, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 335 (1987). See also W. Miller, A Congres-
sional Committee on National Security: The Perspective from the Hill, in THE FIRST USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Raven-Hansen ed. 1987); Manning, The Congress, the Executive and
Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306 (1977); Banks, First Use of Nuclear
Weapons: The Constitutional Role of a Congressional Leadership Committee, 13 J. LEGIS. 1
(1986); Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1326-35 (1988).
58. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21, 97-98,
110-111, 139-40 (1911). See also L. LEVY & D. MAHONEY, THE FRAMING AND RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION 162, 225-30 (1987).
59. Comment, The Rise and Fall of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449 (1987).
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IV.
We do not have to search far for a body that meets these criteria. It
is a court. State courts routinely decide disputes about the institutional
conduct of government. Other democracies recently have turned to this
way of safeguarding their institutions. The United States Supreme Court
has often decided disputes about the relative power of the other branches.
Observers who anxiously watch the vital signs of the Warren revolution
under the 14th Amendment may overlook the extent to which most civil
rights cases now involve only laws that can be and have been amended,
60
while the Supreme Court's interest has returned to structural issues.6 '
One such decision was crucial to the Watergate crisis: denying Presi-
dent Nixon's defense of executive privilege against turning over the in-
criminating White House tapes.62 Other cases were less dramatic. The
Court denied a taxpayer standing to sue for the publication of CIA ex-
penditures under article I, section 9, of the Constitution.63 The Court
began and then abandoned a venture to exempt state employees from the
reach of the federal commerce power.' Renewed lamentations over the
grave of federalism turned to wails this year when the Court denied tax
immunity for interest on state bonds. 65 The Court allowed one. question-
able step of enormous consequence to the political constitution when it
ruled that Congress could subsidize the presidential campaigns of large
parties more than small ones.6 6 But the Court disapproved the structure
of the Federal Election Commission, because it included and was selected
by members of Congress, which may not itself execute the laws or ap-
point those who do.6 7
60. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 reaches private
acts of discrimination); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (college's noncompli-
ance with Title IX results in program-specific, not institution-wide, sanctions. Overturned by
Pub. L. 100-259 (1988)); AFL-CIO v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (Title VII affirm-
ative action plan may benefit individuals who are not direct victims of prior discrimination);
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Title VII prohibits sexual harass-
ment on the job).
61. Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C.L. REV. 901,
902 (1987).
62. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
63. United States v. Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974).
64. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (rey'd, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1984)).
65. South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988), reh'g denied, 108 S.Ct. 2837 (1988);
Hawkins, An Ode to the l0th Amendment (May Federalism Rest in Peace), GOVERNING, July
1988, at 74. See also WORKING GROUP ON FEDERALISM, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN
AMERICA (1986)(suggesting measures to revitalize federalism).
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
67. Id. at 139-140.
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Similarly, the Court disqualified the Comptroller General from the
budgetary forecasts that force spending reductions under the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law.68 Although the Comptroller General is ap-
pointed by the President, he can be removed on the initiative of Con-
gress, and his primary responsibilities are to Congress, not to the
President.69  But the Court sustained the Independent Counsel law,
which gives a special panel of judges the task to appoint special prosecu-
tors70 , over the objections of the Department of Justice and of Justice
Scalia that the law invaded the President's domain.71
The most important of the new structural decisions, INS v.
Chadha72 , denied Congress the "legislative veto" as a device for letting a
committee, one house, or Congress as a whole control executive actions
by anything less than a new law. This action is legislative if Congress is
to do it at all, and legislative action must be presented to the President
for approval or disapproval, not the other way around.73 To Justice
White's argument that the Court had needlessly destroyed a "useful
political invention," Chief Justice Burger answered that "even useful
'political inventions' are subject to the demands of the Constitution
which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how
those powers are to be exercised."
'74
The issues of power in these cases do not involve the lawmaking
power of the government as a whole, but rather its allocation between the
branches, as did the older cases about the President's power to remove a
postmaster or a Federal Trade Commissioner .7  The novel question in
the new cases was who would represent the constitutional claims of the
Congress. Mr. Chadha and the Attorney General both opposed the legis-
lative veto, but the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction because the Sen-
68. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act's formal
name is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1988).
69. Id. at 737-46 (Stevens and Marshall, JJ., concurring).
70. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988).
71. Id. at 2628-29.
72. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
73. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that the legislature "may not grant
itself the power to act as an agency." State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 778 (Alaska
1980). See also Levinson, The Decline of the Legislative Veto, 17 PUBLIUS 115 (1987).
74. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. For criticism of Chadha by one experienced student
of interaction between the Congress and the executive, see L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 178-183 (1985). See also L. FISHER, CON-
STITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 224-229 (1988),
describing informal post-Chadha adjustment.
75. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926); and see supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
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ate was permitted to defend the use of that device.76 Earlier, the Court of
Appeals had let Senator Ted Kennedy attack a presidential pocket veto
on grounds that it diminished his vote. 7 But most suits by members of
Congress have been rejected on grounds of standing, ripeness, nonjusti-
ciable subject matter, or equitable discretion. 78 The Supreme Court
turned away Senator Goldwater's attack on President Carter's termina-
tion of the Taiwan defense treaty without prior consent of the Senate.79
Four justices called the issue a "political question" because it involved
foreign relations and because the Constitution is silent on the Senate's
role.80 Justice Powell disagreed, but he thought the suit premature be-
cause Congress had not formally challenged the President's action.8 '
When Congress provided that a member might challenge the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, the Court bypassed this provision and found that
another party had standing.82
If the courts decline to hear legal disputes between legislators and
the executive branch, the reasons are important, and they have been con-
troversial. Some judges and justices believe that congressional standing
is limited by the "separation of powers." More often, divergent ideas of
standing and justiciability have been lumped together under the general
heading "case or controversy," which in turn is said to be "founded in
concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.",
8 3
Why is a legal dispute between government institutions not a "case
or controversy" unless some third party is involved? It is not that the
stakes for the litigant are greater than for the institutions whose power is
in question, or for other segments of the nation. Vastly more is at stake
in the power of Congress to place agencies beyond the President's control
than the salary of a Federal Trade Commissioner. The consequences of
denying Congress an ongoing role in decisions that it has delegated to the
executive dwarf the issue of staying a deportation order, important as
that may have been to Mr. Chadha. Why do courts violate the separa-
76. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931.
77. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
78. See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 243-
44 (1981).
79. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997, vacating 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
80. 444 U.S. at 1002.
81. Id. at 997-98.
82. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
83. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975), quoted in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750 (1984). See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose
Vote is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1986).
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tion of powers if they decide such issues in legal proceedings between
Congress and the President, but not if they decide the same issue in an
action for the commissioner's salary?
"Separation of powers" generally is expressly stated, not merely im-
plied, in state constitutions, without any effect on justiciability of genuine
legal disputes between the branches.84 The idea that adjudication of legal
disputes directly between parts of the government is improper in a "dem-
ocratic society" should raise some eyebrows. The Supreme Court's polit-
ical generalizations beyond the Constitution tend to be parochial. Many
democratic societies, in fact, have paid the Supreme Court the compli-
ment of turning to courts to safeguard their constitutions; and they do so
in direct proceedings. Austria, Italy, and the German Federal Republic
all assign to courts the task of securing democratic institutions as much
as that of protecting human rights. In France, the Conseil Constitution-
nel was created specifically to decide disputes between the parliament
and General De Gaulle's presidency, and only after 1971 began to review
statutes for compliance with substantive rights.85 The Italian court may
decide conflicts between the chief organs of the state.86 Similarly, the
European Community relies on its court to settle legal issues between its
political organs.8 7 These democratic societies concluded that a judicial
umpire is not improper but rather essential in a system of separated pow-
84. An illustrative provision is Oregon's Article III:
Section 1. Separation of Powers. The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three separate departments, the Legislature, the Executive, including the admin-
istrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of
these departments shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided.
85. See generally Beardsley, Constitutional Review in France, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 189
(1975); Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363 (1982).
86. The Italian Constitution gives the Italian Constitutional Court authority to decide
"conflicts ofjurisdiction between the powers of the State." LA COSTITUZIONE DELLA REPUB-
LICA ITALIANA [CosT.], art. 134, para. 2. "The Court may adjudicate conflicts of competence
between the fundamental organs of the state, such as the President of the Republic, Parlia-
ment, the Council of Ministers . . ." and the top courts themselves. M. CAPPELLETTI, J.
MERRYMAN & J. PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 78 (1967).
Professor Cappelletti also notes the institution of constitutional review in Cyprus, Turkey,
Malta, and Greece:
Indeed, it seems as though no country in Europe, emerging from some form of un-
democratic regime or serious domestic strife, could find a better answer to the exi-
gency of reacting against, and possibly preventing the return of, past evils, than to
introduce constitutional justice into its new system of government.
Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1985).
87. In the Court of the European Communities, the Council may bring proceedings
against acts of the executive Commission, and the Commission may bring proceedings against
acts of the Council, and perhaps the same applies to the Parliament. See T. HARTLEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 351, 391-92 (1981).
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ers. The British still cling to Parliament as the sole forum for constitu-
tional disputes; but then, the United Kingdom does not call itself a
republic.
The difficult problem is not whether the legislature as a body may
sue or be sued. It is whether and when a minority may enforce govern-
ment according to law. In France, since 1974, sixty members of either
house of parliament may take an issue to the constitutional council.88 In
the German constitutional court, review may be sought by the state or
federal governments, by either house of parliament, or by one-third of its
members, and also by the parliamentary parties or by individual mem-
bers who can show an injury to their rights or duties.8 9 In American
courts, too, some legislators have asserted minority claims against the
majority, and others have sought to hold the executive to account in suits
that have legal merit but that the majority does not pursue.90 Requiring
a legislative plaintiff like Senator Goldwater first to seek a legislative
remedy differs from permitting his pursuit of a legal remedy to be frus-
trated by mere inaction.91 These problems of congressional standing sur-
faced in the Bork nomination, as we shall see.
V.
The issues in the Supreme Court's new structural cases were impor-
tant, but the republic did not depend on the answers. 92 The question put
to Benjamin Franklin was not about the form of the republic, but
whether we would have a republic or a monarchy. 93 The test would not
be whether Congress could select officials. The test would come when a
President claimed the power to act without the assent of Congress.
88. CONST. art. 61. See also Beardsley, supra note 85 at 218-19.
89. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 93; HESSE, GRUNDZOGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DES
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTCHLAND 250-52 (13th ed. 1982). Parliamentary minorities have
standing to sue parliamentary defendants in campaign financing disputes in the European
Community Court and in Israel. See Note, European Economic Community-The Use ofArti-
cle 173(2) of the EEC Treaty to Contest Actions of the European Parliament, Partie Ecologiste
'Les Verts' (The Greens) v. European Parliament, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 85 (1988);
Schmalz, A Survey of a Selection of Judgments Delivered by the Supreme Court of Israel, 20
ISRAEL L. REV. 489, 491 (1985).
90. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.
Supp 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
91. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 255
(1981).
92. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, had serious doubts that the legislative veto
complied with a republican form of government as Madison understood it. Vansickle v.
Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 511 P.2d 223 (1973).
93. See supra note 1.
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When we speak of three "equal" branches, let us recall which is first
and indispensable. The United States had a Congress before it had a
president or federal courts. We could have kept a republic without a
president or without federal courts. We could not have a republic with-
out a congress, or with only a powerless assembly. A state with only a
governor and judges would fail the test of a republican form of govern-
ment. The republic is found, beyond periodic elections and the bar
against titles of nobility, in clauses that are unknown in constitutional
law classes, but that took parliaments centuries to gain from monarchy:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law ... ,94 Only Congress can "lay and collect
taxes.. ." for the common defense,95 "and no appropriation for the army
shall be for more than two years.96 "[A] regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time.' 97 Members of Congress, for what they say in speech
or debate, "shall not be questioned in any other Place."98
These clauses anticipated that the risk of monarchy would come, as
it always has come, when the executive demands funds and men to fight
wars or to govern territory or peoples who do not share in the govern-
ment, and for this claims the prerogatives of discretion and secrecy.
When there is broad national consensus on the goals and the means of
foreign policy, Congress gives presidents wide discretion to pursue these
goals, and few legal issues arise. But what options are open to Congress
when it wants to support the goals of a policy under conditions or priori-
ties different from the administration's? Then authorization is hedged
with restrictions, and disagreements will turn into legal disputes. Exam-
ples are the use of foreign assistance and covert operations.
Foreign assistance, the government's chief economic instrument of
foreign policy, includes sales and financing of weapons as well as grants
and loans for economic purposes. Congress traditionally left presidents
wide discretion over the use of authorized funds. When Congress wished
to maintain some control over these uses, it first required reports. Sec-
ond, it restricted some kinds of assistance to some countries unless the
President found that the national interest overrode the restriction. Con-
gress could require detailed findings to be submitted to Congress in ad-
vance of the assistance. This was done in imposing human rights
94. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
95. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
96. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
97. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 9.
98. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
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conditions on security assistance.99 The administration, however, has
objectives for security assistance that it considers more important than
human rights. Its reports could be expected to gloss over abuses that
would disqualify a recipient whom the administration wishes to support,
for instance in Central America."° What then?
Congress can do what it does in any other field. It can ask questions
and demand answers. It can rely on its own sources of information and
hear witnesses who contradict the administration's report. It can tighten
the standards or disapprove funds for the future, and even withdraw ex-
isting authority if it can get the issue on its agenda. If Congress does not
trust the administration's objectives, it can reclaim the power to author-
ize each specific transaction. It cannot, in light of Buckley and Chadha,
reserve to itself or one of its committees the approval or disapproval of a
proposed grant of assistance by means short of passing a law.
Complex restrictions can be attacked as "micromanagement," but
they cannot be disregarded. They do, however, turn policy disagree-
ments into legal disputes about interpretation and about facts. When
Congress itself is divided, administration lawyers will search out every
ambiguity for an excuse to avoid a restrictive clause. This is what hap-
pened in the "Contra" half of the Iran-Contra Affair, which featured the
issue whether the National Security Council was an "agency or entity of
the United States involved in intelligence activities" within the meaning
of the Boland Amendments.101 Whatever Congress chooses to do, it can
do openly.
The Iran-Contra affair also involved the second example, covert op-
erations. The law calls these "special activities," and they include any
action "in support of national security objectives abroad which is
planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is
99. Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69 (1988).
See Franck & Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the Chadha
Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1985).
100. See THE WATCH COMMITTEES & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRI-
tIQUE: REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1987, June 1988, at 1-5 (suggesting that just such a glossing-over occurs);
Note, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S. Human Rights Legislation, 13 YALE J.
INT'L L. 111 (1988).
1 101. There are two Boland Amendments. Both amended intelligence appropriations meas-
ures in efforts to limit CIA intervention in Nicaraguan affairs. Joint Res. of Dec. 21, 1982,
i'ub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982). A detailed legislative history of thd amendments
a ppears at 133 CONG. REC. H4584-987 (daily ed. June 15, 1987). See also S. REP. No. 216, H.
REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 395-99 (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT]. See
also Riesenfeld, The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations Revisited,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 409 (1987).
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not apparent or acknowledged publicly."" °2 To this we owe that elegant
phrase, "plausible deniability."
It seems that we want our government to disown its covert acts, but
we do not want those acts to be lawless (except where they are per-
formed). In a free republic, we put such things into law, as the Iran-
Contra report proudly noted. 103 President Truman's directive candidly
listed "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, includ-
ing sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures, subversion against
hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements,
guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-
communist elements;"" ° but I suppose Congress did not care to put
these government programs into the United States Code.
To whom is a government accountable for acts that are meant to be
disowned? The government can deceive the world only if it deceives its
own people. As part of the post-Nixon reforms, covert actions require
authorization by the President, the famous "findings." 1 5 The President
himself must share in a false denial-unless he is not informed, the
Poindexter version of "plausible deniability." But Congress dislikes being
lied to, and with its own consent. What could Congress do?
The devices available to control foreign assistance do not work for
covert activities. Congress can and does impose restrictions on known
activities such as aid to the anti-Sandinista forces, but it cannot openly
legislate for specific actions in which the role of the United States is not
acknowledged. Appropriations are hidden in agency budgets and known
only to a few members. Congress can only tenuously be said to enact
unknown terms or restrictions in secret committee minutes. Oversight
by the Intelligence committees is also confined by secrecy; only major
disasters like the Iran-Contra affair lead to autopsies in public hearings.
The Iran-Contra committees wrote: "The intelligence committees
are the surrogates for the public on covert action operations," but also
that "sensitive information remains secure when it is shared with Con-
gress." 10 6 They meant shared with the committees. Their response to
the affair has been to demand more advance reports and more "consulta-
tion" with designated leaders, sometimes only the two top party leaders
102. National Security Council Directive NSC 10/2 (1948), quoted in W. LEARY, THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS 131-34 (1984); See IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 101, at 376.
103. Id. at 383.
104. National Security Council Directive NSC 10/2 (1948), cited and quoted in IRAN-CON-
TRA REPORT, supra note 101, at 375-76.
105. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982).
106. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 101, at 384.
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in each House."17 The Justice Department actually testified that telling
Congress of covert actions could infringe not only the president's prerog-
ative but his duty: "A President is not free to communicate information
to Congress if to do so would impair his ability to execute his own consti-
tutional duties."' l So the committees draw the battle line, not at the
responsibility of Congress to the public, but at the committees' own pre-
rogatives. They complain that they were not informed of the scheme to
mine Nicaraguan harbors, although Senator Moynihan says that only
Senator Goldwater and he, the chairman and vice-chairman, would be
informed anyway. 109 Informed for what purpose? Why should we sleep
better if Senator Moynihan and Senator Goldwater, or their successors,
have been let in on the secret?
The Tower Commission said that "[c]onsultation with Congress
could have been useful to the President. . ." in gauging public reaction
and deciding whether to pursue a proposed action."'0 For that purpose,
why should not a president be free to choose his own confidants-a Sena-
tor Laxalt, for instance? A great constitutional issue is reduced to the
right to serve as a test sample. A committee, even the party leadership, is
not the Congress. Representative Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House
committee investigating the arms sales to Iran, has treated the intelli-
gence committees' assent to a covert action as equivalent to support by
the Congress."' Former Senator and Secretary of State Muskie fell into
the same error when he said that successful covert operations "have en-
joyed prior congressional approval."" 2 Consultation may assure that the
President understands what his agents plan to do. It may lay the founda-
tion for future criticism or lawmaking. But legally, congressional leaders
107. S. REP. No. 276, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 36-7 (1988). Amendments to the National
Security Act were drafted to remove ambiguities deliberately inserted in a 1980 compromise
with the executive branch. See 134 CONG. REC. 52224-50 (daily ed. March 15, 1988).
108. S. REP. No. 276, supra note 107 at 19-20 (emphasis added) (testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Charles J. Cooper).
109. Moynihan, The Modern Role of Congress in Foreign Affairs, 9 CARDOZO L. REv.
1489, 1497 (1988).
110. PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, TOWER COMMISSION REPORT at IV-7 (Feb-
ruary 26, 1987).
111. Hamilton, Toward Effective, Lawful Covert Actions, Wall St. 3., Aug. 24, 1987, at 22,
col. 3. Representative Hamilton's argument is inconsistent. He writes that "key elements of
accountability are present because appointed and elected officials in both branches of govern-
ment are actively involved," but that "the committees cannot stop the initiation of a covert
action," and also that "Congress" has supported covert actions in "90% of the cases." Id.
(Emphasis added.)
112. Muskie, The Chains of Liberty: Congress, President, and American Security, 14 CoR-
NELL L. F., Feb. 1988, at 2, 6. Muskie has contrasted the failure of consultation in the Iran-
Contra Affair with the uncontroversial role of congressional "observers" in arms control talks.
Muskie, Congress and National Security, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 949-50 (1988).
can neither give nor deny consent on behalf of Congress to a covert ac-
tion any more than to other executive acts.13
Consultation has a price. Leaders who have had their say may be
coopted, if not to assent, at least to silence. When their colleagues and
the public are deceived, they share in the deception. Members who are
fundamentally at odds with a policy of covert actions are likely to be
excluded from the committees. The opposition party might be excluded
altogether, if the Constitution permits that. A critic of secret actions is
better off if he is not briefed. Even then, the critic may be accused of
breaching a secret, as Speaker Jim Wright was in September, 1988.1'
Those who have been briefed in turn may feel constrained from contra-
dicting the allegations. And the executive can deflect criticism in the
Congress by pointing to its consultation with a few members who cannot
speak for others and whose undisclosed views the executive need not
accept.
The republic's debates cannot be half secret and half free. Last
April, the Senate Ethics Committee criticized Senator David
Durenberger, a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
for certain statements, not because his statements in fact disclosed secret
information, but because they, appeared to do so, and "such appearance
jeopardized the mutual confidence which must exist between the Con-
gress and the Intelligence Community.""' 5 The difference between the
public and its self-described surrogates is that the public need not main-
tain the confidence of the intelligence community.
In short, the Iran-Contra committees merely restated the contradic-
tion; they did not resolve it. Procedural demands for prenotification of
congressional leaders do not take the place of substantive restraints. The
real threat behind the demand is not that these leaders will secretly ad-
vise against an action but that they may publicly denounce it. Of course,
113. In 1984, after the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the Senate Intelligence committee
actually entered into a written agreement with CIA Director William Casey. S. REP. No. 665,
98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1984). In 1988, the committee repeated from its 1984 report: "The
Committee is entitled by law to be informed of the President's Finding authorizing such an
action in advance of its implementation and to offer its counsel, but does not have the right to
approve or disapprove implementation of the finding." S. REP. No. 276, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1988), quoting Sen. Rep. 665, supra, at 6. When the Iran-Contra Report states that notifi-
cation "protects the CIA from charges that its actions are unauthorized," it must mean, unau-
thorized by the President; the oversight committees cannot render a final legal judgment on
authorization. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 101 at 378.
114. White House Chides Wright for Comments on C.I.A. Actions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1988, at A15, col. 1; No Classified Data Bared, Says Wright, The Oregonian, Sept. 23, 1988, at
A16, col. 5.
115. Letter from United States Select Committee on Ethics to Senator David Durenberger
(April 29, 1988).
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members should abide by congressional rules of secrecy, as the Iran-Con-
tra Minority Report emphasized." 6 Still, potential disclosure, at least to
other members, is the significant sanction because such a breach of se-
crecy can be punished only within Congress itself, one of the main safe-
guards of the republic.117 This is why prior consultation might have
saved presidents the embarrassments of the Bay of Pigs, the mining of
the Nicaraguan harbors with its subsequent defiance of the International
Court of Justice, and the sale of arms to Iran. Yet some are proposing to
"ensure the integrity of the consultative process" by expelling any mem-
ber who discloses whatever the executive has chosen to classify as a se-
cret.118 Secret consultation gains nothing for Congress or the public
when it divides debate of the nation's acts between the unbriefed majority
who can speak freely and a few who refer darkly to secrets that they
know but cannot tell. Again, we are left to rely on a political division
between executive and congressional leadership, the same division that
frustrates effective open policies.
VI.
This is true also of legal limitations on open policies, such as the
human rights conditions attached to foreign assistance, to which the ex-
ecutive at least pays lip service. It is doubly true of the War Powers
Resolution," 9 which the executive does not accept. In the War Powers
Resolution, Congress, over President Nixon's veto, directed the with-
drawal of American forces from actual or imminent hostilities within
sixty days unless Congress authorized other action. Presidents have re-
fused to apply this law even in situations like the attack on the American
warship in the Persian Gulf, in which thirty-seven sailors were killed,1
20
116. The minority report, and particularly Representative Cheney, a co-author and former
White House chief of staff, have demanded stronger oaths and stiffer penalties against "leaks."
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra, note 101, at 584-85.
117. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl.1; cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (Senator
who read classified documents to public record is protected by speech and debate clause).
118. For example, Section 5(c) of the proposed Use of Force Act, which would require that
except in extreme emergencies the President consult with Congress before using force abroad,
provides that:
To ensure the integrity of the consultative process, it is the intent of each House of
Congress, acting under Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the Constitution, to expel any
member who discloses classified information transmitted in connection with such
consultation, unless one of the committees specified in this section agrees, by a vote
of two-thirds of its full members, to disclose such information.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE USE OF
FORCE ACT 4 (Comm. Print 1988).
119. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
120. Cushman, Iraqi Missile Hits U.S. Navy Frigate in Persian Gulf, N.Y. Times, May 18,
1987, at 1, col. 6.
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and the administration itself defended shooting down a civilian airliner
on grounds that another ship was engaged in combat at the time . 21
Congress can enforce compliance whenever it insists on its institu-
tional powers, but of course, Congress does not act as a monolith. Its
purpose and its design are to reflect divergent interests and divergent
views of the public interest. The time to worry is when Congress stam-
pedes in a single direction, as in the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Ordinarily,
some members will agree with a president's policy on the merits, some
others will acquiesce for partisan reasons, and some will think that the
violation of law is not worth the cost of confrontation.
The result is what Professor Lawrence Sager calls "underenforced
norms." 12 2 They are underenforced, not because they fail to state a legal
rule, but because compliance is left to shifting political judgments. As
Professor Gerhard Casper notes, rules for conduct of foreign and defense
policies that lack sanctions are not treated as legal restraints. 123 The ab-
sence of case law invites self-serving assertions, and the uncertainty fa-
vors the branch that takes the initiative. Moreover, when a court calls a
straightforward legal issue a "political question," the term invites a flatly
political answer and diminishes whatever legal judgment others might
bring to bear on it. Understandably, constitutional lawyers have looked
for a less political forum. Does use of the courts as this forum create
obstacles that Congress cannot overcome?
When the House Judiciary Committee did not impeach President
Nixon for usurping congressional power in his secret bombing of Cambo-
dia, because Nixon had given notice "to Congress by informing key
Members,"' 24 Professor (now Judge) Louis Pollak observed that "the
confidential briefing of a few 'key' Representatives and Senators [is not]
the 'functional equivalent' of retroactive approval by Congress."' 25 Inso-
far as the dispute concerns the law governing such secret presidential
war-making, however, the republic loses if the law must be settled in an
impeachment proceeding or not at all. Professor Pollak proposed an
amendment to the War Powers Resolution to let Congress bring suit for
compliance with a disputed provision. 126 But his proposal assumes an
121. Johnson, Scattered U.S. Aides Link Up By Phone on Airliner Incident, N.Y. Times,
July 4, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
122. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
123. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A
Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 463, 466-67 (1976).
124. 120 CONG. REC. 9028, quoted in Pollak, The Constitution as an Experiment, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1318, 1336 (1975).
125. Pollak, supra note 124, at 1336.
126. Id. at 1338.
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"impasse" between a president and Congress as a whole, not only that a
minority exhaust its remedies by asking the majority to assert a legal
claim, as Senator Goldwater had done. 127 Requiring a suit by Congress
as a whole puts a premium on resistance and delay within Congress. It
makes inaction the equivalent of consent. It lets the executive branch
continue on an unlawful course as long as its supporters in Congress and
those who prefer not to confront the issue can avoid a vote. It leaves a
minority helpless to preserve the law even though it is right. Others,
therefore, would allow a minority to sue under some circumstances, as
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman tried to do over Cambodia 2 ' and
many Representatives have attempted over the War Powers
Resolution. 129
In this debate, Judge Bork's position was uncompromising. When
fourteen Republican Representatives sued the Democratic leadership of
the House for proportional seats on House committees, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the Representatives had standing to sue and that a court
might have to remedy unconstitutional procedures, but it withheld relief
on prudential grounds. 3 ' Judge Bork would have denied that the Con-
gressmen had standing in court. He insisted that the issue was not pru-
dential but jurisdictional.' Later' he dissented when the court
invalidated President Reagan's' attempted pocket veto of human rights
restrictions on security assistance to El Salvador at the suit of thirty-
three members, even'when the leaders of both houses joined as plain-
tiffs. 132 Bork would not let Congress give the courts jurisdiction over its
legal disputes with the executive however it tried; to Bork, a bitter polit-
ical stalemate, even impeachment, is better than involving the courts.
One wonders at the vehemence of these views. As we know, courts
decide institutional issues in cases involving minor private claims. In
state courts like Oregon's, such issues can be raised by taxpayers or in
public actions like mandamus or quo warranto as long as there is a genu-
127. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
128. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
129. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D. D. C. 1987) (110 House members sued to
enforce War Powers Resolution; dismissed on basis of equitable discretion and political ques-
tion doctrine). Professor John Hart Ely would revise the War Powers Act to let any member
of Congress sue for a declaration that actual or imminent hostilities exist. Ely, Suppose Con-
gress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988). This is a
desperate solution, which any judge (including this one) would try to avoid, though Ely notes
that judges often decide the existence of hostilities in insurance cases, and the court would not
decide on the use of military forces but find only that the facts required Congress to decide it.
130. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 1176-77 (Bork, J., concurring).
132. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Bork, J., dissenting).
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ine present dispute between adversary parties. 133 But more directly,
many state decisions recognize standing for legislative institutions.'34
The Supreme Court decided such a suit between the American Gover-
nor-General of the Philippines and the territorial legislature. 135 All that
Mr. Marbury asserted against Secretary of State Madison, and Represen-
tative Powell against the House, was a right to a public OffiCe.136
Article III assigns to the Supreme Court cases and controversies be-
tween states, which have governmental, not personal, interests. Issues
that the government calls nonjusticiable when it is sued cannot be
avoided when the government is the plaintiff, as when it sues to close a
PLO observer mission at the United Nations,137 or to seize property
under an executive agreement,1 38 or when it courtmartials a serviceman
for disobeying what the defendant claims to be an unlawful order.
139
Whatever else keeps a court from deciding some legal disputes, it is not
133. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or. 472, 753 P.2d 939 (1988)
(upholding taxpayer standing to seek orders declaring governor's line item veto invalid); see
also, in Delaware, State ex rel. Oberly v. Troise, 526 A.2d 898 (Del. 1987) (state quo warranto
action allowed, to challenge Governor's commission appointments issued without Senate's
consent).
134. See, eg. Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d I (Alaska 1976) (legislative officers and legis-
lature as a body challenge limitation on governor's appointment powers); Legislature of Cal. v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal.3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (legislature challenges
proposed special election); Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985)
(state assembly challenges appropriations veto); Dye v. State ex. rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332
(Miss. 1987) (senators challenge constitutionality of senate rules); Goodover v. Department of
Admin., 651 P.2d 1005 (Mont. 1982) (senators challenge capitol renovation program); ef May
v. Cooperman, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing state legislators' standing as interven-
ors) appeal dismissed sub. nom. Karcher v. May, 108 S. Ct. 388 (1987) (legislative officers had
left office). See also Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 28 n.170 (1986).
135. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928). See also Thir-
teenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (Guam legis-
lature empowered to override governor's line-item veto); Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Eleventh Legislature of the Virgin Islands, 536 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1976) (Virgin Islands legisla-
ture may not override Governor's item veto); Dessem, supra note 134, at 28 n.170.
136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969).
137. United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp 1456 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
138. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942). Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (suspending creditors' claims to
Iranian assets pending international arbitration).
139. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 347 (1987). ("Sufficient standing to
maintain a lawsuit challenging the President's authority might be alleged by a member of the
armed forces if ordered to the scene of hostilities conducted by the President without congres-
sional authority for more than sixty days in, for example, Nicaragua....").
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the separation of powers."
In the trenches of the D.C. Circuit, judges very different from Bork,
like Carl McGowan and Abner Mikva, have also resisted direct litigation
between legislators and executive officials, partly to compel political com-
promise, and partly to preserve courts for the task of protecting individ-
ual rights.' 4 ' But the questions of remedies and discretion on which they
relied can be resolved by statutes, as was done in creating declaratory
judgments. Judge Skelly Wright, in his Biddle lecture nine years ago,
feared that if the courts did not stay out of institutional disputes, a
"political backlash" might strike at the courts' powers in the area that he
thought most essential, equal protection under law.'42 The nation would
not come to an end, he said, if judges declined to enforce the structural
provisions of the Constitution.'43 Judge Wright's fears were misplaced,
if the experience of state courts is any guide. Decisions protecting civil
rights provoke public anger, not decisions enforcing lawful
140. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Also, if a legal question would properly be
decided when necessary to an adjudication between other parties, it is not nonjusticiable as a
"political question." One can describe as a "political question" the issue whether the govern-
ment should engage in an activity, but not whether the activity is legally authorized or prohib-
ited. Denial of review on that basis implicitly decides the government's claim of legal
discretion on the merits. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96-98, 105-107
(2d ed. 1988); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 213 (1972); Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959); McCormack,
The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595 (1987).
141. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985); McGowan, Congressmen
in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 254-55 (1981). Judge Mikva admits that his
view of congressional standing is influenced by McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D.
Idaho), aJfJd sub. nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981), which rejected Senator
McClure's standing under a special provision to challenge Mikva's appointment. But could a
court escape deciding the issue if raised by any litigant appearing before the challenged judge?
See, e.g., United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Cf. Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (individual challenge to Article III recognition of retired judges).
142. Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1979) (4th Francis Biddle Memorial Lecture, Harvard Law School, Oct. 16, 1979).
143. Id. at 10. This is also Dean Jesse Choper's view. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980). Professor Peter Quint suggests that, in the
absence of legislation, the extent to which courts can control executive self-aggrandizement
should depend on whether individual rights are at stake. But since the injured persons may
not be Americans, the question remains whether members of Congress or anyone else may
protest unlawful action on their behalf. Quint concludes his studies of separation of powers
under Nixon and Carter: "The history of this period emphasizes that if executive policymaking
authority is to be restricted, these restrictions must be imposed by clear and sustained legisla-
tive action, rather than by reliance on executive forbearance or self-limitation by even the most
willing and accommodating executive officers." Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter,
62 TEX. L. REv. 785, 891 (1984). See also, Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon:
Reflections on Constitutional Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1 (1981).
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government. 144
There are stronger reasons for caution. Theodore Sorenson, who
knows something about White House behavior, wrote after Watergate:
"It is precisely because periods of war and emergency are most likely to
induce an extension or usurpation of presidential powers that those peri-
ods most require the objectivity, calm, and long-range view that the
courts are particularly equipped to provide." '145 But will courts provide
them? Or will they only bestow legitimacy on executive acts whose law-
fulness otherwise would remain debatable?146 The Supreme Court let the
executive relocate and intern Americans because of their ancestry 47 and
it took Congress forty-six years to decide that a wrong had been done. 148
The Court often defers to claims invoking "national security," particu-
larly those involving the CIA.1
49
Judge Wright did not express his doubts as a bar to jurisdiction.
1 50
Judge Bork, who had few doubts, did. The popular controversy over
placing Bork on the Supreme Court raged over his views on civil rights,
the judicial agenda of the Warren years that Judge Wright wished to
preserve. Far less visibly, but equally strongly, the Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected Bork's views on the older agenda, the constitution of
the republic. The committee's report criticized him for stating that Con-
gress could not limit President Nixon's discretion to bomb Vietnamese in
Cambodia or control CIA activities by law, and that the special prosecu-
tor law would be unconstitutional, and generally for exalting the execu-
tive over the legislative power. 151 Particularly, the committee rejected
Bork's rigid views against congressional standing. It noted that many
144. The distinction between issues of constitutional government and issues of indi-
vidual rights does not withstand examination. Compliance with constitutional
processes is the predicate for any government action; when an action is ultra vires,
there is no need to decide whether a properly authorized action would violate a guar-
antee of individual rights.
Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 305 Or. 472, 478, 753 P.2d 939, 942-43 (1988).
145. T. SORENSON, WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHT 126 (1975).
146. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 131 (1962).
147. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
148. Wartime Reparations for Japanese Americans, Pub. L. No. 100-83, 102 Stat. 903
(1988) (H.R. 442, which formally apologized for the internment and established a trust fund to
pay reparations, was signed by President Reagan on August 10, 1988.). See generally, IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (1983).
149. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (prepublication review of
CIA author justified by compelling governmental interests in national security information and
appearance of confidentiality); Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988) (Congress grants CIA
director unreviewable discretion to terminate employee); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
(following Snepp).
150. Wright, supra note 142, at 9.
151. S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-62 (1987).
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important laws do not affect private parties who can go to court, leaving
the President who declines to comply subject only to the improbable risk
of impeachment The report concluded:
Reasonable people may differ about the circumstances under
which it is appropriate for the federal courts to entertain lawsuits
brought by Members of Congress-or the institution itself-to vin-
dicate Congress's constitutional prerogatives. The committee finds
alarming, however, Judge Bork's categorical rejection of congres-
sional standing in all instances. As Justice Powell recognized,
when Congress and the President reach irreconcilable positions re-
garding a matter of constitutional law, resolution of that conflict
by the courts is fully consistent with the constitutional responsibil-
ity of the judicial branch to say what the law is.152
VII.
At the end of our Bicentennial television specials, the Iran-Contra
enterprise was discredited, a few people were prosecuted, the National
Security Council staff and the CIA were put under new squeaky-clean
directors, Judge Bork's judicial career ended, and we once again turned
our attention to electing a new president.
The 1988 presidential campaign seemed to be about pledging alle-
giance to the flag. As some of you perhaps were taught, the allegiance is
to the flag and to the republic for which it stands. The pledge says
"and," not "or the Republic," although some patriots like Lt. Col. North
think that it calls for a choice.
What have we learned about the republic's institutions, and what
might we ask of them in this Bicentennial of ratification? I offer only
some modest answers. As in Biddle's day, governmental powers again
form the constitutional agenda. The public battles over the constitu-
tional powers of the two branches are political rhetoric phrased as legal
claims. Legally, there is little an administration can do if Congress for-
bids it. This applies abroad as well as at home. Congress, however, must
act by laws. It cannot insert its members into administering laws nor
make executive acts (other than treaties) contingent on the approval or
disapproval of less than the whole Congress.
The genuine issues, then, are twofold. One issue is executive power
in the absence of express restraints, executive power implied from broad
statutes or from the Constitution. A claim that the President may act if
the Congress does not forbid it shifts the executive's burden to show au-
thority to a burden on Congress to withdraw authority. Such a claim
152. Id. at 64.
was rejected in the "Steel Seizure Case."' 53
Congress has increasingly narrowed executive discretion, thereby
provoking battles over veto-proof conditions on funding and protests that
Congress prevents any consistent policy, but faithfully reflecting the pub-
lic's division over the uses to which American power is put. Despite the
constitutional rhetoric, the power of Congress to impose most conditions
is not seriously in doubt. But administration lawyers and supporters ar-
gue for an executive prerogative even against congressional action in the
use of military force and in covert operations. Can we settle such legal
arguments short of stalemate or impeachment?
A theorist could argue that in these matters the Constitution is not
law; an American politician could not. Or one could say that the Consti-
tution is law, but that the law leaves open the control over the use of
American force abroad; in other words, that either answer to the legal
question may be right at any one time.154 Some may call this desirable
flexibility, but it would be sophistry to call it law.
One can say that there is a right answer, but it cannot or should not
be settled, at least not by the courts. That view does not appeal only to
judges. Better that some matters remain debatable than that they be set-
tled wrongly. But it will not do to say that a legal issue vital to the
republic should be decided in some other forum without specifying
where.
We need a forum for settling constitutional arguments between Con-
gress and the President short of stalemate or impeachment. And we
should put behind us once and for all impeachment and a trial in the
Senate as a way to settle uncertain law, rather than alleged refusal to
abide by the law. For better or worse, the nation has come to accept
courts as the right forum, whatever people may think of a given decision.
So perhaps we might ask this of our institutions:
153. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). This shift is not
peculiar to executive powers in high matters of state. In everyday law enforcement, many
courts generally assume that only constitutional guarantees confine police actions without first
examining subconstitutional sources of and limits on the officers' authority. See, e.g., Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (assuming that police have state authority to make discre-
tionary stop to check automobile driver's license and registration, a question of state law). But
see State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988) (rejecting U.S. Supreme Court's
assumption that police have "community caretaking function"). See generally Dix, Fourth
Amendment Federalism: The Potential Requirement of State Law Authorization for Law En-
forcement Activity, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1986-7).
154. Edward S. Corwin called the affirmative grant of powers in the Constitution "an invi-
tation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." See CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 171 (1957); see also L. FISHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DIALOGUES (1988).
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(1) Of Congress, that acting on the Senate's views in the Bork nomi-:
nation, it define by general law or resolution who among the leaders and
members of each house may seek a declaratory judgment in a dispute
that has not yielded to other specified efforts at settlement. I speak of
standing; there also are issues of timing, exhaustion of remedies, and pos-
sible mootness. The decision to litigate on behalf of a house of Congress
may be made by a special bipartisan committee, subject to action of the
house;155 but standing should extend to minority parties and also to indi-
vidual members when their individual rights are at issue, much as it does
in France or Germany. Indeed, for such claims they need standing even
without being granted it by the majority.
(2) Of the courts, that they return to the practice of basing decisions
on subconstitutional grounds and defer constitutional rhetoric so as to
leave room for legislative action, and particularly that they preserve their
constitutional power to serve as the forum of last resort. This means to
avoid resting denials of standing on Article III of the Constitution so as
to foreclose in advance standing conferred by law or resolution as a legit-
imate case or controversy. It is no more undemocratic for judges to de-
cide governmental powers if the dispute is directly between the republic's
institutions than if the same issue is raised by some private party. That
distinction is contradicted in the states and abroad.
(3) Of the executive, we might ask that its lawyers be slower to
claim prerogatives against congressional power, and then only if they are
prepared to identify a forum whose judgment of the claim the executive
will accept. If the executive finds any contemporary variation of the old
proposals for a constitutional council any more acceptable than the
courts, it should propose one.
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But the chief burden of Franklin's answer-a republic, if we can
keep it-rests not on the executive or on the courts but on Congress. An
executive will not long defy a Congress that acts in the form of law and
means it. Congress, not only the executive, decided against full compli-
ance with the constitutional demand to publish an account of the expen-
diture of all public money.
The problem is that Congress, like anyone else, wants to have it both
ways. It hopes that the nation can be a republic at home and act like a
monarchy abroad. Congress, too, is caught up in the paranoia of power,
155. For a description of existing offices and procedures, see Fisher, Constitutional Inter-
pretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REV. 707, 729-30 (1985).
156. Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C.L. REV. 901,
902-03 (1987); Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway? 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 29 n.170 (1986).
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as the Iran-Contra report shows: The more powerful we are, the more
our interests are threatened around the world. 157
As the main threat that has sustained this fear abates, the balance
should shift back to the republic. Meanwhile, Congress tries to cover the
gap with devices like secret briefings of a few members who cannot par-
ticipate in the decision and may not share with Congress what they
know. What sustains such a device is only the healthy apprehension that
a sufficiently indignant member will rely on the congressional privilege to
speak against an unacceptable action. If Congress seriously punishes
such a member, it will only silence those members whom Congress itself
has chosen to be briefed and leave the debate to those who have not been.
In my office hangs a poster published in Denmark in 1941, under
the German occupation, on the 700th anniversary of the Danish version
of Magna Carta. It begins with these words:
Ved Lov skal Land bygges .... Men ingen Lov er saa god atfplge
some Sandheden: hvor man er i Tvivl om Sandheden; der skal Lov
finde, hvad Ret er.
(With law shall a land be built .... But no law is so good to follow
as the truth; where one is in doubt about the truth, there law shall
find what is right.)
As long as Senators and Representatives can use the power of law to
find out what the truth is, and even against the wishes of the majority to
debate what is right, I think we can take a chance on ratifying the repub-
lic for another century. Then in 1989, we can celebrate the Bicentennial
of the First Amendment that lets the press report and the rest of us de-
bate what Congress finds.
157. The United States of America, as a great power with worldwide interests, will
continue to have to deal with nations that have different hopes, values, and ambi-
tions. These differences will inevitably'lead to conflicts. History reflects that the
prospects for peaceful settlement are greater if this country has adequate means for
its own defense, including effective intelligence and the means to influence develop-
ments abroad.
Organized and structured secret intelligence activities are one of the realities of
the world we live in, and this is not likely to change.
IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 101, at 384.
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